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Multiculturalism, biosemiotics, 
and cross-cultural friendship: 
An essay review of Olteanu’s multimodal 
semiotics of culture
Claus Emmeche1
Review of Multiculturalism as Multimodal Communication: A Semiotic Perspective 
[Series Numanities – Arts and Humanities in Progress 9; Dario Martinelli, series 
ed.] by Alin Olteanu. Cham: Springer, 2019, xviii+140 pp.
More than merely a sum of cultures, plurality is a prerequisite for cultural genesis. 
Mainstream multiculturalist theory appears to ignore that cultures are intrinsically 
pluralistic. (Olteanu 1990: 7)
“Democracy also means voluntary choice, based on an intelligence that is the out-
come of free association and communication with others. It means a way of living 
together in which mutual and free consultation rule instead of force, and in which 
cooperation instead of brutal competition is the law of life; a social order in which 
all the forces that make for friendship, beauty, and knowledge are cherished in order 
that each individual may become what he, and he alone, is capable of becoming.” 
(Dewey 1937: 474, quoted in Olteanu 1990: 71)
We are living in a world with intensifying global commerce and exchange between 
people coming from different ethnicities, cultures, and nations; speaking different 
languages. Not only do we meet people from other countries and cultures at work 
or in the marketplace, we increasingly form lasting social relations of love and 
friendship across … ‘cultures’? I wonder what makes something deserve the label 
‘intercultural’. Some of the persons dearest to me have a native background in 
Southeast Asia and Africa, and my closest friends and colleagues come from a 
variety of countries. A friend of mine considers himself to be a nomad with a 
hybrid identity. We move between countries and living different places for some 
1 Section for History and Philosophy of Science, Dept. of Science Education, University of 
Copenhagen, Øster Voldgade 3, 1350 Copenhagen K, Denmark; e-mail: cemmeche@ind.ku.dk.
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years makes an influence and changes us, but are we representing multiple 
cultures? Maybe not exactly, if we are really all ‘moderns’, or, if you like, none 
of us has ever been completely modern (pace Latour). So, what is this fuss about 
multiculturalism? Can semiotics help us understand it? Having worked with 
biosemiotics for some years, I was thrilled when offered to review a book dealing 
with multiculturalism from a semiotic perspective, promising in its preface to 
have developed a “semiotic theory of multiculturalism”. Now, having read it, 
I am reminded of the old blues song “The thrill is gone”. I will try to explain 
why this is so. Was the reason a loss of focus, a lack of interplay between theory 
and case analyses, or something else? I will also illustrate some challenges of 
understanding the topics of the book through an example, the question of how to 
interpret friendship across cultures as seen from the point of view of cross-cultural 
friendship research.
Is there a standard notion of multiculturalism? The English edition of Wikipedia, 
in itself a multicultural and multilingual phenomenon, contains a very long 
entry on ‘multiculturalism’ and a brief one on ‘polyculturalism’. The latter, rarer 
term is defined as “an ideological approach to the consequences of intercultural 
engagements within a geographical area which emphasises similarities between, 
and the enduring interconnectedness of, groups which self-identify as distinct, 
thus blurring the boundaries which may be perceived by members of those 
groups”2. In some sense, this is the approach adopted in the book about multi-
culturalism under review, though its author, semiotician Alin Olteanu does not 
use the term ‘polyculturalism’. Olteanu follows polyculturalism in emphasizing the 
blurred boundaries between cultures.  
The version of multiculturalism that is at the centre of Olteanu’s investigation 
is not exactly the one explained at the beginning of the long Wikipedia entry (that 
underscores multiple meanings of multiculturalism). This entry suggests it is “a 
synonym for ‘ethnic pluralism’, with the two terms often used interchangeably, 
for example, a cultural pluralism in which various ethnic groups collaborate and 
enter into a dialogue with one another without having to sacrifice their particular 
identities”3. So, according to Wikipedia, polyculturalism allows one to appreciate 
blurred boundaries between a variety of different cultures, while multiculturalism 
is concerned with preserving and respecting the identity of such cultures. 
Olteanu critically interrogates the notion of identity implied by influential 
2 ‘Polyculturalism’ at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polyculturalism was accessed in Novem-
ber 2019.
3 ‘Multiculturalism’ at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism was accessed in No-
vem ber 2019.
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versions of multiculturalism, especially the idea of culture as having an essen-
tial significance for defining the identity of all its members. Even though multi-
culturalists may aim at providing space for different cultures to co-exist peacefully, 
there is a risk of tensions due to cultural differences. In other words, multicultural 
ideology risks, as Olteanu rightly points out, to overemphasize (or essentialize) 
differences and ignore similarities between people from different cultures. 
The problems of culturalism
Right from the beginning, Olteanu locates his theoretical intervention in the 
wider context of recent populist anti-democratic movements in democratic 
societies all over the world: the main purpose of the book is that of “criticizing 
the mainstream academic theories of multiculturalism, as particularly relevant to 
democracy, globalization, digitalization and intercultural communication that […] 
failed to deliver a program for democracy and conviviality” (Olteanu 2019: vii). 
He claims that it is a problem for the humanities to face these challenges directly, 
due to a “comfortable and slothful lingering in academic discourse of an ideological 
theory of culture, first signalled by Eriksen and Stjernfelt” (Olteanu 2019: vii). What 
is this ideological theory of culture? His reference is to a highly recommendable 
analysis by Eriksen and Stjernfelt in their book The Democratic Contradictions of 
Multiculturalism (2012). The problem with the humanities, according to Olteanu, 
is that they have fostered a false and too holistic-totalizing notion of culture and 
cultural identity, a notion that can directly be taken over by nationalistic and 
chauvinistic politics (a discomforting case of an “impact” of the humanities). As 
Olteanu notes, “populist rhetoric often starts from the other end: It emphasizes a 
supposed importance of identity, cultural or otherwise, for the purpose of generating 
conflict and separatism. To have an identity means to be different from others. To 
have a cultural identity means to be the same as some, by opposition to others” 
(Olteanu 2019: ix). 
In the book’s six chapters Olteanu claims to develop a so-called semiotic theory 
of multiculturalism as an alternative to this ideological notion of culture. He does 
not distinguish between (1) actually creating such a theory (eventually inspired 
by or generalized from empirical investigations or other analyses of particular 
multicultural phenomena) and (2) merely exploring philosophical possibilities for 
its creation and development. I think he does the later, not the former. The book 
is more ‘theoretical’ in the sense of commenting upon existing literature (often 
leaving the reader without proper introductions) than in the sense of forging new 
concepts and model their interrelations into a new theory. 
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The first chapter on multiculturalist discourse offers a useful and critical 
overview of some multiculturalist theories and their development as being pre-
mised upon a deeply ideological concept of culture, called ‘culturalism’ by Olteanu, 
following the critique by Eriksen and Stjernfelt’s (2012) of the same phenomenon. 
This ideological concept implies an idea of completely monocultural and mono-
lingual communities and a quite rigid notion of cultural identity. These elements 
fuel present-day identity politics of recognition. The real problem with an impli-
citly culturalist idea about multiculturalist phenomena is the very taking for 
granted that it is possible clearly to define and delimit each culture (as if it were an 
organism) among others, and thus the belief that all cultures have distinguishable 
borders in space or time. According to Olteanu, the opposite is the case: “the main 
characteristic of culture” (missed by the multiculturalist theories criticized) is that 
“cultures do not have distinguishable borders in space or time”. Thus, a culture 
does not have “an external borderline that can be touched or crossed and which, 
consequently, would react (positively, negatively or otherwise) when touched from 
the outside, as a biological organism would react” (Olteanu 2019: 2). 
Here, one could notice that the likely existence of fuzzy borders between 
cultures, and the real vagueness of various notions of culture, does not imply that 
distinct cultures do not exist or cannot be individuated (just like the fact that a 
border between a forest and a meadow is a fuzzy one does not imply that they 
are not two different ecosystems). I think the main target of Olteanu’s critique of 
the culturalist conception is better described as its essentialism than its insistence 
upon clear-cut boundaries. If culturalism essentializes the mode of existence of 
any culture, the challenge is to develop non-essentialist accounts of culture that 
might retain some features of vernacular “culture speak” (as when people compare 
two companies with a flat versus a hierarchical “leadership culture”). In fact, I 
think this is part of Olteanu’s project. 
Apart from essentialism, another aspect criticized by Oltenau is the totalizing 
perspective of culturalism, that exaggerates the causal power of enculturation 
(socialization into a culture), as if a person could only belong to or be influenced 
by one single culture – why should there be a limit to how many cultures, genres, 
or styles can affect a person? Indeed, I do not experience my friends to be limited 
this way. Olteanu argues that this idea comes from a language-centred theory of 
culture, which regards human cognition and organization as deeply linked to a 
single specific language. In such a conception, language and culture are like dual 
aspects of one indivisible whole (the nation, its native people, their way of life) 
and a person has to belong to only one such holistic entity, or at least he or she is 
typically “enculturated” into one such culture. Think of yourself, dear reader: To 
which culture do you really belong? How to single out a specific one?
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The question is not just a descriptive one, or one of social scientific under-
standing of ourselves as members of multiple groups within a society, it is also 
political. Olteanu criticizes the tendency within this version of multiculturalism 
to elevate a group’s particular “rights” over universal human rights. Even though 
one may be sympathetic towards a political stance fighting for a higher degree of 
self-determination for minority groups, the question about the legal framework 
for how ‘self-determination’ is to be enacted should be addressed. There is a 
problematic tendency for some brands of politically motivated multiculturalism 
to seek to prioritize supposed special habits, ways of life and local understandings 
of any minority culture over and above the universal human rights or the common 
laws within a liberal democratic state governing all its members. As Olteanu 
(2019: 5) points out, such “clusters of organizations, alternative to the state, are 
dangerous both for liberal democracy at a state level, as they upset the rule of law, 
and for their own members. They obstruct the state from defending the rights of 
individual members of the minority group by the claim that the state does not 
understand their own cultural norms. […] in such situations, minority group 
members who are seen as culturally deviant within their own respective groups 
are particularly vulnerable and often oppressed by the community to which they 
supposedly belong.” He quotes a question that the Israeli-American professor of 
law Amos N. Guiora raised in his Tolerating Intolerance: The Price of Protecting 
Extremism (Oxford University Press 2014), namely “how much can a democratic 
society tolerate the intolerance of its composing communities? That is to say, when 
does a society become oppressive and undemocratic on account of its pretense 
to all-encompassing tolerance?” (Olteanu 2019: 5). Olteanu rightly points out 
that this version of multiculturalist theory appears to ignore that cultures are 
intrinsically pluralistic.
In contrast to the aim of defending diversity, multicultural theories too often 
end up in a kind of separatism, the view that a human being can never fully 
participate in the socio-cultural life and organization of more than one cultural 
group. For instance, if an Italian, to use Olteanu’s own example, migrated to the 
USA, she would never fully participate in American culture and society because 
of her Italian background. The best she could do is to find a community of Italians 
in the USA where she can blend in. Still, according to Olteanu, there is hardly 
anything like ‘Italian culture’ or ‘American culture’: there is a diversity comprising 
many cultures within the borders of a modern state. Socio-cultural organization 
is very different in Milan, Rome and Palermo. The problems that an immigrant 
from Palermo will face in New York are in many respects the same as she might 
face in Rome. 
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The separatist outcome of current versions of multiculturalism is argued by 
Olteanu (and his predecessors Eriksen and Stjernfelt) to be grounded in American 
anthropology, continental structuralism and “the linguistic turn” in philosophy 
of language. These intellectual currents developed their theories of culture in the 
aftermath of the Second World War, and shared cultural relativism as a common 
denominator. Against these relativist theories, Olteanu generates his alternative – 
or at least explores its possibility – based on theoretical resources from recent 
scholarship, particularly in semiotics and biosemiotics, including new readings 
of Peirce (but also Husserl and Merleau-Ponty) that develop Peirce’s pragmatic 
semiotics as a realist phenomenology of meaning. This allows one to see that 
cultures are not independent and separable phenomena. Thus, Olteanu dynamizes 
the concept of culture, seeing cultures as pluralistic and as having vague borders: 
Each culture is diffused with other cultures! Not only the meeting of cultures, 
but any semiosic phenomenon implies plurality and generates diversity. The 
meeting of two cultures, A and B, does not have to be more semiotically complex 
than the dynamics within A itself, to the extent such a dynamic can be singled 
out. The mutual involvement of A and B with each other does not leave them 
unchanged, in “relativist isolation” or original shape, “because no such shape ever 
existed” as Olteanu (2019: 19) writes. He also draws upon a convergence between 
educational theories and (bio)semiotics that opens for a new perspective upon the 
interconnectedness of life, sign action (or meaning), and learning. 
 
Culture is multi-culture
Most of the book’s chapters take the form of commentaries to theories within the 
humanities, with the reader hoping that this will lead up to the author proposing 
his own theory. In the second chapter (“Cultural relativism and the politics of 
recognition”) Olteanu discusses the role that non-Peircean semiotic theories – 
based on notions of opposition and difference (de Saussure, the structuralist, 
and the poststructuralist traditions) – have had for cultural theory in general and 
for the concept of cultural identity. He criticizes the inconsistencies of cultural 
relativism and its dangerous implications for politics, such as separatism and 
disrespect for universal human rights. Drawing on the recent examples of the 
Brexit referendum and Catalonia’s attempt at a secession from Spain, he concludes 
that both nationalism and a multiculturalism-endorsing isolationism originates 
in culturalism: both the political left and right “take advantage of the relativist 
epistemology that culturalism supposes, namely that there is no universal non- 
or pre-cultural axiology of values by which an act can be deemed moral or not, 
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right or wrong, to impose a political ideology. In this view, any human action 
is meant to be morally judged within a culture’s own relative axiology. This is 
one of the main reasons revealing the need of developing the present semiotic 
approach to multiculturalism, free of holistic determinism and cultural relativism” 
(Olteanu 2019: 52). I am not convinced that culturalism alone can bear the burden 
of explanation for the resent surge of popularistic nationalisms we can see around 
the world, and the reader could supplement this with the analysis by Fukuyama 
(2018), providing additional explanatory factors such as the democratization 
of the politics of dignity (the demand for recognition by various groups), the 
expressive individualism in modern societies, and the politics of resentment.
In Chapter 3 (“Semiotics and multiculturalism”) Olteanu argues in favour of 
“a mereological semiotics”, comprehensive of the crucial roles of iconicity but 
also of indexicality. His use of mereology – often understood as a theory of parts 
and wholes – in its adjectival form to characterize semiotics is never explained 
in detail, which is typical of Olteanu’s writing in ways that are incomprehensible 
to outsiders (a bit unfortunate for a book about multicultural communication). 
Those acquainted with Peirce may guess in what sense his semiotics is mereolo-
gical, but even Peirce scholars will disagree about how exactly the semiotic 
parts and wholes are interrelated. Apart from this, the chapter advocates for 
the necessity, for any cultural theory, of what Olteanu calls ‘biocentrism’. I think 
Olteanu is trying to say that any theory of culture should be rooted in a theory of 
human beings seen as biological phenomena. Strangely, he never explains what 
precisely biocentrism is, only that it is achieved in biosemiotics. Yet biocentrism 
can have different meanings in ethics, metaphysics and epistemology, and I think 
the biocentrism related to biosemiotics is primarily an epistemic one (knowledge 
acquisition is seen as universal property of all biosystems, not only in humans, as 
anthropocentric theories would have it). Later on, it becomes clearer that Olteanu 
is searching for a theory that would root all human capacities for communication 
and understanding in some bio-cognitive and bio-social capacities, shared across 
our species’ different cultures, and shared with our human ancestors and some 
non-human animals.
The book’s fourth chapter (“Language, culture, and pluralism”) takes a closer 
look upon pragmatism’s different versions and their consequences for multi-
culturalism. Pluralism was already a hotly debated topic in the early pragmatism of 
Peirce, James, Dewey, and the Polish-born American philosopher Horace Kallen, 
who in the early 20th century argued against the notion of the ‘Americanization’ of 
European immigrants. Some of the pragmatic accounts of pluralism, as Olteanu’s 
nuanced discussion shows, resulted in arguments in favour of isolationism as a 
means to preserve diversity. He argues that biosemiotics – because it inherited 
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Peirce’s version of semiotic pragmatism, including Peirce’s specific concept of 
continuity – implies a better construal of diversity and pluralism that does not 
endorse isolationism. Cultures are not to be seen as separate languages, as this would 
easily lead to a cultural relativism: Thus, “cul ture cannot be conceived as isolated: 
culture is multi-culture” (Olteanu 2019: 81). In this chapter Olteanu (2019: 82) 
admits that a “fully and explicitly semiotic approach to multiculturalism has not 
yet been developed” and leaves the reader impressed with his scholarly capacity to 
clear the undergrowth of a theoretical wilderness, though leaving genuine theory 
construction behind as an unfinished project. What we are offered is instead a 
hope that a biosemiotic approach “can offer fresh and critical insights by making 
possible the bridging of, for instance, cultural and evolu tio nary anthropology and 
sociobiology and sociolinguistics” (Olteanu 2019: 82).
Basketball and phenomenal proximity
The fifth chapter (“Biosemiotic multiculturalism”) claims to develop a biosemiotic 
approach to multiculturalism, as an alternative to existing anthropocentric and 
language-centred cultural relativist theories. It is said to be founded on Cobley’s 
(2016) biosemiotic approach to culture, and Olteanu (2019: 90) claims that 
“human-specific modelling systems, hence the cultural organizations of humans 
and their scientific pursuits, are rooted in non-linguistic modelling systems as 
stemming from each species’ and individual’s semiotic competences”. Strangely, 
this should imply that “our cultural organizations cannot make abstraction of the 
physical (hard) environment and, more importantly so, of the environment as 
perceived by human physiology” (Olteanu 2019: 90). A charitable interpretation 
of this convoluted sentence would be that human physiology and the biophysical 
environment constitute basic preconditions for the existence of human culture 
and its organizational forms. This, however, is hardly surprising and makes no 
constraints on the human capacity for abstract thought. 
Olteanu may be right in pointing to a continuity in the modelling of natural 
environments between human and non-human organisms. This view suggests that 
[…] all human beings, regardless of linguistic competences and cultural pecu lia-
rities, understand reality starting from the same, basic semiotic compe tences, which 
come with human body morphology and physiological features. In addition, many 
such competences are shared across species, implying that modelling systems of 
distinct species overlap to various extents. (Olteanu 2019:  90)
598 Claus Emmeche
Though one can hardly disagree, it would be surprising if that should imply 
that biological variability of our individual features (height, weight, skin colour, 
physiognomy, etc.) should be the dominant predictor of our capacity to share 
phenomenal worlds, as Olteanu seems to think:
Arguably, a person who lives in Barcelona, and is a native speaker of Catalan, and 
is two-meters high is phenomenally more proximal to a native speaker of Urdu 
who lives in Lucknow and is two-meters high, rather than to another Catalan 
native who lives in Barcelona but is one-and-a-half-meters high. The two taller 
individuals, for instance, could rather play basketball together than with the 
shorter person from Barcelona. They would share phenomenal worlds (umwelten) 
to a larger extent, having common experiences, such as of how is it like to be taller 
than the average and how are they perceived in their societies. (Olteanu 2019: 91)
Olteanu reassures us that he does not want to underestimate the immediate 
counter that “the two speakers of Catalan can much more easily express to 
each other their agreements and disagreements, negotiate and, in general, 
collabo rate” (Olteanu 2019: 91), but he does not use this to go back and discuss 
critically what the idea of sharing phenomenal worlds or umwelten really implies 
for talking animals like us. This omission and the very quote indicate a limit, 
rather than an advantage of a purely biological (or even biosemiotic) approach 
in understanding such a multidimensional notion as the phenomenal worlds 
of human beings, shared or not. This limit is related to the potential threat of 
reductionist simplification (well known from previous debates over sociobiology 
and evolutionary psychology) that conceptualizes all human variability (social, 
cultural, psychological) as basically biologically determined. Even to some 
proponents of the umwelt theory as applied to humans, the quoted passage would 
be problematic, as it fuses distinct levels of bio-cognitive processes that should be 
distinguished, just like Thure von Uexküll (1986) distinguished between levels of 
semiosis in vegetative, animal and human sign systems.
To recapitulate, a central reason why a multicultural theory (and any theory 
of culture) according to Olteanu must presuppose a biological theory is that the 
human capacity to communicate is rooted in our biology, and thus, a theory 
of communication must similarly require a biological theory. Is such a theory 
developed by Olteanu? He is rather laying the foundations upon which the bricks 
and mortar for such a theory can later be laid (which is of course a legitimate 
enterprise when so declared). To illustrate the approach to theorizing, consider 
this quote (where each asterisk substitutes a reference in the original text): 
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[…] biosemiotic modelling theory accounts for a mereological theory of culture, 
wherein cultures are inner pluralistic, and their components have relative 
independence from the whole. As such, since cultural structures can be inherited 
from one culture to another, neither can cultures be clearly and strictly be 
separated one from the other. As Cobley observes, Sebeok’s semiotic notion of 
environment, umwelt, as inherited from von Uexkü ll is best translated into English 
as model [*]. In Sebeok’s words, “All organisms communicate by use of models 
(umwelts, or self-worlds, each according to its species-specific sense organs), 
from the simplest representations of manoeuvres of approach and withdrawal 
to the most sophisticated cosmic theories of Newton and Einstein” [*]. In this 
view, the biosemiotic approach to cross-cultural communication largely coincides 
with ecosemiotics [*; *; *]. Biosemiotics is also compatible in most ways with the 
semiotic framework of education (see [*; *]), termed edusemiotics [*; *]. The 
edusemiotic framework also underpins a construal of learning as coextensive with 
living, liberated from the narrower scope of pedagogy and educational sciences. 
This account of learning recommends regarding intercultural communication as 
a learning phenomenon. (Olteanu 2019: 106) 
Apart from loosely (i.e., without much detailed argument) relating some concepts – 
modelling, culture, environment, organism, communication, representation, 
etc. – to one another and referring to previous theoreticians who juggled with 
those concepts in various ways, the text proposes some things these theories 
“do” epistemically (one theory “accounts for” another, one approach “largely 
coincides” with another, or is “compatible in most ways” with another, one 
“accounts” for some phenomenon, or “recommends” to regard something as 
some thing else, etc.). What is happening in this paragraph, as in most of the 
chapter, not to say the whole book, is an attempted amalgamation of previous 
perspectives, fields, “theories”, and ideas into a perspective that might be called 
a theory, but could also, more modestly, be called exactly that, a perspective, a 
point of view, a complex idea from which a theory may later be developed. This is 
not an unusual ‘style of reasoning’ (to use a concept developed by A. C. Crombie 
and I. Hacking, see Hacking 2002) within the humanities, and it is highlighted 
here more as a declaration of content than as a critical comment, but for a 
newcomer or even for a fellow traveller of one of the mentioned approaches, it 
would still have been nice to have had a more systematic and “slow” treatment 
of the many theories mentioned. For instance, nowhere in the monograph can 
one find an explanatory exposition of Sebeok’s distinction between primary, 
secondary and tertiary modelling systems; it is mentioned in passing as if trivial 
or self-explanatory, but at the same time Sebeok’s contribution is given high 
prominence. This free-style commentary, let me call it associative hermeneutics, is 
a legitimate style of reasoning if it bewares the risk of slipping into merely being 
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free associations in the domain of theory, without critical constraints such as 
historical context, interpretative specificity and structured argumentation4. With 
no such constraints, one can invent “Peirce’s solution” or “answer to multicultural 
situations” (Olteanu 2019: 107) by quoting the master’s musings on the categories 
of experience from the early twentieth century. It is a very open question what 
that solution really consists in, just as the headline of this part, “The Symbolic 
Species debate and its consequences for multiculturalism” suggests an answer 
about consequences that we do not get. Where was the editor at Springer or the 
series editor who should have reminded the author about unfulfilled promises? 
Using quotations from Peirce as an argument demands more context specificity, 
especially awareness about source texts and their status within Peirce’s total work. 
When Olteanu tries to use Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics, including the idea 
of evolution by ‘creative love’ (Peirce’s so-called ‘agapasm’) as a stepping stone to 
his own “theory” of multiculturalism, he writes “With the doctrine of agapasm 
Peirce offers, besides a full-blown theory of evolution of meaning, a shortcut to 
what a theory of multiculturalism, in his view, should be based and focused on” 
(Olteanu 2019: 109). This sentence seems to suggest that Peirce, who died in 1914, 
had opinions about a theory of multiculturalism; it would look less hilarious had 
it been suggested as a speculation about what Peirce counterfactually would have 
thought about multiculturalism. 
Some parts of the text commit a fallacy that is unfortunately well known from 
the history of ideas, namely that of reducing a structural similarity to sameness: 
e.g., if one discourse has an aspect of relativism, and another discourse also has 
relativist features, then both basically commit the same errors (assuming that 
relativism is wrong) and can be subjected to the same criticism. Look at this 
example: 
Kuhn’s theory implies that scientific communities determine scientific research 
as construed within the linguistic possibilities of their technical language which 
has to be, in turn, determined within the possibilities and structures of the natural 
language(s) in which research was carried. The semiotic realist reply to this is 
that Kuhn’s position does not justify the falsifiability of scientific hypotheses 
and the fallibility of scientific theories but, rather, it renders science infinitely 
subjective, limited and limiting instead of insightful and revealing. Like in the case 
of Marrone’s concept of text […], it can be argued that, in Kuhn’s conception, a 
scientific paradigm cannot offer conclusive proof of phenomenal evidence. Such is 
also the reason that led Lyotard […] to consider metanarratives unconvincing and 
4 Th e structure of a text can be improved by the use of footnotes making the distinction 
between the main argument and minor explanatory or referential details clearer. Olteanu’s text 
has no footnotes and presents both types of material in a hierarchically unordered manner.
 Multiculturalism, biosemiotics, and cross-cultural friendship  601
that postmodernity is the condition of human societies realizing the unavoidable 
ideological bias of all knowledge. As such, in this view, as Kuhn considers, any 
scientific progress can only be perceived as due to chance and consisting in a 
revolution, the unexplainable and accidental happening of scientific paradigms 
agreeing on a new understanding. It is obvious that the criticism that Eriksen 
and Stjernfelt address to cultural relativism is the same that biosemiotics […] 
addresses to the glottocentrism of (post)structuralism. The same criticism is 
applicable to linguistic turn pragmatism, with its notion of cultural pluralism, as 
seen most evidently in Kallen […]. (Olteanu 2019: 88) 
There are some bold parallels suggested, but they are not based on in-depth 
critical discussions of the extent to which for instance Kuhn can be called a 
relativist, or of the nuances that Kuhn confers to the notion of ‘the falsifiability 
of scientific hypotheses’, here mentioned in passing as something self-evident, 
and as if falsifiability was a notion on par with the general notion of fallibility. 
Kuhn actually tried in his own way to account for the fallibility of science, without 
denying scientific progress tout court, and Kuhn’s instrumentalism concerning the 
criteria of success for scientific work could just as well be seen as having an affinity 
to pragmatism, even though Kuhn did not embrace Peirce’s theory of truth. Kuhn 
and Lyotard may both be relativists, but their relativisms are quite different. More 
depth, details and nuances are needed to avoid the analysis to degenerate to a 
Manichaean story about an eternal big fight between the good realists and the bad 
relativists. 
Collapsing dichotomies, eluding a theory
In its title the book promises to give the reader a semiotic perspective upon multi-
culturalism as multimodal communication. The first five chapters said nothing 
about multimodality, so it is with some accumulated expectations that one comes 
to the sixth and last chapter, titled “An embodied approach to multimodal com-
munication”. It promises to join together the previous discussions with semiotic 
theories of multimodal communication, with the purpose of setting the ground 
for a new theory of intercultural communication. The approach aims to address 
the phenomenology of embodiment and its consequences for knowledge and 
communication, particularly as expressed in biosemiotics. Already in the chapter’s 
abstract a strong thesis is suggested, namely that “no communicational instance 
can be labelled as non-intercultural, just like no particular translation can be 
monomodal”. Does that mean that we should give up these distinctions, mono- 
versus multimodality, and intra- versus intercultural? 
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Perhaps so, because such distinctions appear for Olteanu to be Cartesian, 
dualist, and to be traced back to the linguistic turn in philosophy and ultimately 
to Ferdinand de Saussure’s distinction between langue, language as a system, and 
parole, actual speech (disregarding de Saussure’s methodological argument for 
making this distinction). According to Olteanu, a “non-dualist, non-essentialist 
and non-ideological approach to culture should collapse the dichotomy between 
language and speaking” (Olteanu 2019: 116). He claims that biosemiotics 
eliminates this distinction by its embodied account of meaning where meaning 
is always embodied in some form. The later may be the case, but in Sebeok’s 
version of (bio)semiotics, the distinction is far from collapsed; it is retained in 
Sebeok’s distinction between primary and secondary modelling systems. Instead 
of discussing this, Olteanu makes the surprising claim that writing does not 
represent speech. Speech and writing are simply both to be seen as embodied 
“modalities that embody meaning” (Olteanu 2019: 116). Again, a strong, actually 
very radical, thesis, but hardly true in general. 
Olteanu then takes up a suggestion by Stjernfelt to develop “a concept of 
the body which, in itself, makes evident the basic semiotic competences of an 
organism, i.e., a body concept which entails semiotics” (Olteanu 2019: 116), 
and he criticizes cultural studies and most of the established textual semiotic 
approaches to culture for dissociating a text and its morphology. He proposes 
to use the term ‘typography’ to refer to ‘the morphology of a text’. He refers his 
reader to a previous section (2.2.) for an explanation of the term ‘morphology’, but 
in that section one searches for it in vain. We only learn that in linguistics, “text 
is thought of as a weaving of meanings regardless of their material morphology, 
since the double form-content articulation is arbitrary and any content can fit 
in any form” (Olteanu 2019: 41). Thus, it is unlikely to be the standard linguistic 
concept of morphology (as the study of the structure of words and morphemes) 
that is referred to. Olteanu gives a few further clues (apart from references to other 
scholars), such as the postulate that “the concept of text is necessarily typographic, 
in the sense that text is a design, not only a dyadic articulation” (Olteanu 2019: 
117). But what is design? He quotes some typographic design scholars studying 
(a vernacular sense of) design processes of text layout or setup, and makes an 
excursus to the Bauhaus school of design, but does not answer the question of 
what the morphology of a text really is. 
A further hint, however, is given by Olteanu’s mentioning of the long and 
complicated history of the translation (and interpretation) of ancient Greek texts 
of philosophy through Arabic, Al-Andalus language and script into Medieval 
Latin language and script, and up to the present. By claiming that that meaning 
is embodied, Olteanu thinks that “it appears naïve to assume that the designs 
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of the manuscripts and the many transductions [sic] undertaken are irrelevant 
for intellectual history”. This may be so, but he does not tell us precisely how 
“the morphological design” of these texts is relevant and can be seen as impacting 
upon the specific ideas they express, or how the constraints of translation have 
something to do with embodiment. The “embodied approach” will hardly mean 
that the text has a body (except perhaps metaphorically), or that we should take 
an interest in the body of the translator to understand the translation better? The 
discussion about double articulation in traditional linguistics and in semiotics, 
that takes up a large part of the chapter, does not help answering this.
So, what about multimodality? We learn that zoosemiotics, as it is grounded 
in biosemiotics, “already consists in a theory of multimodal representation, 
assuming that animals make sense of their environment through the use of all 
available channels of sensory perception” (Olteanu 2019: 127). At this point, 
Olteanu integrates Darwin and zoosemiotics (with the series editor Martinelli) 
in his Manichean narrative about the fight between an evil modernist Cartesian 
“depreciation of embodied presence and morphology” (Olteanu 2019: 127) and a 
coming age of embodied multimodal presence. Cartesianism is seen as “linked to 
modernity’s monomodal expressivity. Philosophers in the Cartesian tradition have 
considered nature and culture as an irreconcilable dichotomy because it was the 
print medium that framed the mind of modernity” (Olteanu 2019: 127). Against 
this, Olteanu points to the use of new digital media (integrating still and moving 
pictures with text) as motivating “an iconic turn” in studies of art, learning, and 
communication. He expands the extension of the concept of text claiming that 
“design and urban planning are instances of typography because they constitute 
texts of which society is weaved. Text as such, biosemiotics reminds us, is 
morphological” (Olteanu 2019: 128). In my opinion this makes the notion of ‘text’ 
quite fluffy, and we would probably have to keep or rename the more traditional 
text concept when talking about texts in the ordinary sense. 
Olteanu makes this move in a section called “Text as multimodal presence” 
but the forms or modes of existence of this multimodal presence are not 
analysed, he only states that all communication “starts from bodily presence” 
(Olteanu 2019: 127). Instead, his stream of commentaries continues in a section 
on “Ecosemiotics as a digital media theory”. Here, the contributions of Marcel 
Danesi, Gunther Kress, Crispin Thurlow, Kristine Mroczek, Marshall McLuhan, 
Timo Maran, Kalevi Kull and many others are commented upon. Following the 
wave of ecocriticism Olteanu suggests that “during the age of modernity ways 
of production were developed that are harmful for the natural environment 
because the modern medium of printed text alienated human society from some 
of the basic characteristics of its possible umwelten. […] human beings model 
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their environment multimodally, by using a variety of sensory channels. Thus, 
the monomodal medium of the textbook, as spread by print technology, proves 
un-ecological for human society” (Olteanu 2019: 132). I wonder how Olteanu can 
forget that a “monomodal” text like a novel, by its specific contents can convey 
whole universes of sensual sceneries appealing to the reader’s many modalities? 
Just like culture always involve multi-culture, Olteanu should acknowledge that 
monomodal texts engender multimodal interpretants, and if (remember the 
strong thesis from the chapter’s beginning) “no particular translation can be 
monomodal”, why should this not also apply to interpretation? (Another question, 
apropos the “un-ecological”, is whether today’s multimedial devices  – TVs, 
computers, tablets, smartphones, etc. – are less harmful for the environment than 
printed books and papers; but such “empirical” issues are not touched upon.) 
A brief section announcing “A biosemiotic account of typography” follows 
(still without defining typography, or even discussing it) before the final section 
of the chapter, “Writing as scaffolding”, in which we can read this uroboros of an 
argument: 
The crucial contribution of biosemiotics stands in explaining the relation between 
the morphology of the body and its behaviour as iconically developed. By this 
claim, biosemiotics holds that models, or texts, provide phenomenal evidence. 
While claiming phenomenal evidence, texts, which in this case are ecological 
relations, continuously undergo re-modelling. Their reshaping is what we came 
to call writing. Writing, thus, consists in the iconic manipulation of typographic 
forms. (Olteanu 2019: 135) 
Reading such a passage, I am not sure how to make sense of it – on what level of 
generality and by which concrete examples one could illustrate its points, just to 
demonstrate some minimal understanding. Clearly, for biologists, there are lots of 
very crucial non-arbitrary relations between the behaviour of, say, a bat, and its 
bodily shape, including the internal anatomy of its brain and the neurophysiology 
of its sensory apparatuses. To which extent such relations can be characterized as 
iconic (or having also indexical, symbolic or other aspects) is then a complicated 
task for a biosemiotician to sort out. The role of “models, or texts” (apart from 
their implied equivalence?) in such an illustration are completely unclear, also 
regarding any “phenomenal evidence” they might hold. What is the text? And 
what could it not be? Moreover, we do not know what it is phenomenally like to 
be a bat, and we even do not know on a general level what our own phenomenal 
experience of, say, writing by hand or on a computer keyboard or tablet display, 
is evidence of, if not our thoughts. Furthermore, what to make of the two claims 
in this passage that texts equal ecological relations, and that their re-modelling 
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equals writing? Perhaps it is the ephemeral notion (from the start of this chapter) 
of the morphology of a text called typography that is fleshed out here as an 
identity between body and text? Olteanu writes that modelling starts with and 
is regulated by the body’s morphology (which may be true, but how?), and that 
there is a plastic relation between embodied morphology and behaviour. Again, 
perhaps so, but it needs to be demonstrated by analysing the specific behaviour 
and functional anatomy and physiology of human or nonhuman biosystems. 
There is no attempt in Olteanu’s writing to delimit the scope of his wild-growing 
analogies and associative hermeneutics, or to ascertain the borders of validity for 
the many suggestions (no ‘scoping reproducibility’ cf. Leonelli 2018). If “iconic 
manipulation of typographic forms” was all there were to writing (as normally 
understood) we could see the sorting out of garbage into paper, plastic, glass, and 
metal as a special case of writing.
This last section of the book comments upon the notion of semiotic scaf folding, 
and we learn that “small linguistic units, such as phonemes or letters, are struc turally 
similar to the words and phrases to which they contribute” (Olteanu 2019: 136-137), 
yet without getting a characterization of the form of this similarity. The chapter ends 
with these words: “[…], text and model are interchangeable and each of them can 
serve as the central tool for a media semiotic theory fit for the digitalizing context of 
global multiculturalism” (Olteanu 2019: 137). Hardly convincing. 
So, what happened with the promise to address “multiculturalism as multi-
modal communication”? The only hint that the long last chapter gives an im-
patient reader seems to be this: “Digitalization, as a shift from linear and mono-
modal to multimodal media, reminds that the human umwelt is multimodal. 
This suggests that communication which involves a plurality of cultures is a 
sub-case of cross-modal translation. Thus, cross-modal communication is 
a more appropriate idiom for referring to what has been labelled intercultural 
communication” (Olteanu 2019: 129). Without letting us know if ‘cross-modal’ 
and ‘multimodal’ communication are synonyms in his vocabulary, Olteanu now 
subsumes intercultural communication under something called ‘cross-modal 
translation’. What the later term covers is far from clear. 
This is not a theory, not even a coherent semiotic perspective. It is dis-
appointing. I guess that the author got caught in the corpus of texts he eagerly 
comments upon (and does so faithfully, I do not doubt he has a firm grip on the 
selected material or that the book can be useful for scholars within these fields). 
To continue the abductive guesses, perhaps there was time pressure in the final 
part of wrapping up the manuscript for Springer’s deadline, in a lonely process of 
making editorial finish that in “the old days” would have been made in a dialogue 
with a devoted copy-editor, now often outsourced by the publishing houses. 
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Friendship transcending multiculti-culturalism
Above, in the opening quote, John Dewey describes democracy as a way of 
living together that cherishes “all the forces that make for friendship, beauty, and 
knowledge”. Olteanu (1990: 12–13) mentions a special friendship between the 
Sufi Ibrahim ibn Adham and the Orthodox monk Symeon, exemplifying how 
Christians acquired a deeper grasp of spirituality by learning from Muslims and 
vice versa. One religious community can achieve a richer understanding of its 
own spiritual doctrines through dialogue with the other, and in general, dialogue 
and friendship enhance understanding. Perhaps empirical studies of cross-cultural 
friendship can teach us something about the discourse on multiculturalism and 
its limits?
A recent study explored the extent to which people of different origins, 
natives and migrants, come together in everyday life in Europe, drawing on a 
data set generated from a survey conducted in 18 neighbourhoods in six Euro-
pean cities: Lisbon, Bilbao, Thessalonica, Rotterdam, Vienna, and Warsaw 
(Pratsi nakis et al. 2017) – the first study on interethnic friendships based on an 
international data set comparing different neighbourhood types. Despite the 
fears in public discourses about the supposed negative impact of immigrants and 
ethnic minorities on social cohesion, the findings indicate that close interethnic 
relationships are not uncommon in diverse European cities. It also appears that 
“parallel lives” are not the prevailing norm; in contrast, despite its somewhat 
apolitical invisibility, “everyday multiculturalism” can work as a cohesive force 
which resists fragmentation and division.
Another study aimed to understand young people’s intercultural relations, their 
strategies for belonging, and the implications for social cohesion (Harris 2016). It 
focused on two neighbourhoods of major cities in Australia with populations with 
many overseas-born residents. Here, government, community organisations and 
other agencies are very active in implementing initiatives to bring young people 
of different backgrounds together. The study was critical of such governmental 
“top-down” multiculturalism (perhaps influenced by culturalist ideology), where 
social programmes focus on learning about difference and getting along with 
others: promoting intercultural relations through cultural knowledge exchange 
and celebration of diversity can fail to address more pressing issues of racism 
and social inequalities that face young people. Harris’ study gave a compelling 
and thick description of what I was about to call “a cross-cultural friendship” 
but I should rather say an aspect of friendship that actually exemplifies Olteanu’s 
criticism of culturalism: Harris tried to find out what the friendship between “Ana 
(18, Polish background, Catholic, born Poland, migrated aged 16, both parents 
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professionals) and Marley (17, Samoan background, Seventh Day Adventist, born 
New Zealand, migrated aged 1, both parents unskilled workers)” (Harris 2016: 
511) consisted of. The friends themselves could hardly tell, but in the course of 
the interview the insight emerged that “it was a friendship that created a space 
for each to be more than their ascribed identities, and especially to move beyond 
cultural ascriptions and expectations imposed by those experienced as authorities 
in their lives, including ethnic communities, families, the school and other social 
institutions. In this sense, its generative potential was not merely as a ‘cross-
cultural’ friendship, but as a space for exceeding these ascriptions” (Harris 2016: 
512). Obviously, such friendships have meanings far beyond their capacity to 
bridge difference and distance and generate intercultural exchange. 
As emphasized in another new and very detailed study on friendship in a 
multicultural setting, friendship is a “key social relationship in the contemporary 
lexicon of multicultural social relations, given the extent to which friendship 
is mobilised in lay understandings, as well as more formal integration policy 
agendas, as an evidential measure of social cohesion” (Vincent, Neal, Iqbal 
2018: 23). This book is based on sociological studies of primary schools, seen 
by the authors as providing a site for mixing across difference, yet they resist 
the assumption that the processes involved are straightforward. The very word 
‘multiculturalism’ tends to make us focus on cultural and ethnic differences, 
forgetting other social markers like class, and one of their findings is that both 
adults and children cross ethnic difference in their friendships more frequently 
than class difference. This study provides a harmonic blend of original research 
and theoretical reflections showing how friendship studies may provide a lens 
to reflect better upon the issues of multiculturalism. Contributions like those 
of Pratsinakis et al. (2017), Harris (2016), and Vincent Neal and Iqbal (2018) 
remind us that you can come a long way using common interpretative skills and 
ordinary human reasonableness, even without expertise in the science of signs 
and interpretation.
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